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Homepage > Regions / Countries > Asia > North East Asia > Korean Peninsula > North Korea: Beyond the Six-Party Talks

North Korea: Beyond the Six-Party Talks

Asia Report N°269 16 Jun 2015

North Korean soldiers look south on the north side as a U.S. soldier (front) stands guard upon Belgium's Prince Philippe's visit a demilitarised zone separating the two Koreas, on 10 May 2009. REUTERS/Jo Yong-Hak

REUTERS/Jo Yong-Hak


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Six-Party Talks were established in 2003 as a multilateral forum to achieve the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. However, the parties (China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the U.S.) have not met since December 2008, when the talks stalled over verification issues. There is a strong international consensus that North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) should come into compliance with UN Security Council resolutions and abandon its nuclear weapons program but widespread disagreement over the strategy and policies for achieving this. Nuclear arms are now an integral part of North Korea’s national identity, however, so it is increasingly apparent that absent a sea change in ideology or leadership in Pyongyang, the Six-Party Talks will not achieve their central aim. Though governments need to keep up pressure for disarmament and maintain the dynamics of the current containment and deterrence policy, they also should establish – and encourage other international actors to establish – new channels of engagement that may further incremental change in North Korean society.

Since the end of the Cold War, the DPRK has developed a state ideology of sŏn’gun (“military first”). Furthermore, the third generation of Kim family rule has adopted the pyŏngjin line, calling for simultaneous economic and nuclear technology development for both peaceful and military purposes, as Kim Jong-un’s contribution to “scientific socialist thought” and essential to the continuing Korean revolution. Nuclear status has been enshrined in the constitution and statutes, and state propaganda emphasises the role of nuclear weapons, satellite launchers and nuclear technology in the nation’s modernisation and prosperity. DPRK officials often have repeated that Pyongyang will denuclearise when the rest of the world does. Denuclearisation would require a transformation of that identity, in effect revolutionary change. The North has offered to return to the Six-Party Talks “without preconditions” to discuss regional security, nuclear disarmament and other issues – but not denuclearisation.

South Korea (ROK) faces an existential threat from the North’s growing nuclear arsenal. It is divided, however, over policy toward Pyongyang. After activity was detected around the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri in spring 2014, it invested considerable effort in an attempt to restart the Six-Party Talks. By late February 2015, five parties had reached a consensus on the minimum criteria to present to Pyongyang. To test intentions and sincerity on denuclearisation, Seoul has pushed for “exploratory talks” in a track two setting as a first step toward resuming the formal six-party process. If Pyongyang does not meet the criteria for resumption, which have not been disclosed publicly, the U.S., South Korea and others appear poised to take increasingly punitive measures.

There is little likelihood the U.S. would enter upon resumed talks unless there is a much greater prospect than appears to exist that they would be pursued in good faith by the North and not simply for manipulation and propaganda. Experience under the Agreed Framework in the 1990s, in addition to widespread perception that the DPRK is unreliable, make the Obama administration, and almost certainly any future president, sensitive to likely domestic blowback from another failed diplomatic effort with Pyongyang. China does not face the same domestic risks if the talks were to restart and turn out badly. It could always take credit for hosting them, and in the case of failure, blame the DPRK and/or the U.S. Its consistent position has been to restart dialogue even with low likelihood for success.

Japan also has a high threat perception regarding the North’s nuclear and missile programs and generally will support South Korea and the U.S. over the talks. Bilateral discussion of Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s raised hopes for improved relations, but that process also has stalled. Without a satisfactory resolution on abductions, Tokyo will be even more inclined to take a harder line on the nuclear issue. Russia wants the talks to resume as soon as possible. Though sensitive about Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile activities, it believes Washington exaggerates the threat, and its focus is on economic cooperation, which the North welcomes as helping reduce economic dependence on Beijing.

Whether or not an intended exploratory meeting is held, the gap between positions is too broad to expect the Six-Party Talks to resume as a good-faith effort to denuclearise the peninsula. For that, either the DPRK must abandon its nuclear identity and ambitions, or the international community must accept transformation of the talks into a different type of institution that does not address denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. Neither seems possible, so deterrence and containment will remain fundamental for dealing with a nuclear North.

Deterrence is imperfect and could fail, but it will remain a pillar of security in the Korean peninsula for the foreseeable future. At the same time, it needs to be complemented by a broader engagement with North Korea on a range of issues. The self-imposed isolation of Pyongyang perpetuates a dangerous regime, in the same way the U.S. isolation of Cuba may have delayed evolutions in the Caribbean island; every opportunity should be seized to encourage an opening of society in North Korea. Three sets of actors might do so: governments and inter-governmental organisations (IGOs); private sector firms; and civil society. The roles, risks, opportunities, and costs vary, and engagement must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Only governments can sign treaties, impose and lift economic sanctions or change a military posture. Businesses can trade and invest, creating opportunities for contacts and engagement, but unconstrained trade can lead to dangerous technology transfers.

A relevant segment of civil society activities includes educational, cultural, artistic, musical, scientific and sports exchanges. There is no true North Korean civil society activity, but outside non-governmental organisations (NGOs), while they cannot substitute for governments or economic actors, could be important for transmitting ideas and information into the North, which ultimately is necessary to change its thinking, identity and policies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the government of North Korea:

1.  Comply with UN Security Council resolutions regarding development of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, including by:

a) returning to the Six-Party Talks to implement the September 2005 “Statement of Principles” and bargaining in good faith for denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula; and

b) returning to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

To the governments of China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, the U.S. and others:

2.  Refrain from governmental engagement that supports or validates the DPRK’s pyŏngjin line, including by not recognising the North as a nuclear state.

3.  Do not accept transformation of the Six-Party Talks into a forum that ignores de­nuclearisation and recognises the DPRK as a nuclear state, and ensure that engagement with the North takes place in a venue appropriate to the relevant issue.

4.  Continue to enforce UN sanctions against DPRK nuclear and missile programs and maintain vigilant export controls to ensure that dual-use materials and technologies are not transferred to it.

5.  Support engagement of economic actors, within the framework of UN resolutions prohibiting illicit transfers.

6.  Support civil society engagement with the DPRK, particularly programs that enable North Koreans to travel, while exercising care that such engagement is not utilised as a channel for transactions prohibited by UN resolutions.

Seoul/Brussels, 16 June 2015 
 
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Quotes

 Daniel Pinkston

“The Six-Party Talks are dead in all but name. A nuclear program is part of North Korea’s state ideology, and chances for diplomatic talks achieving denuclearisation are close to zero. The risk of a high-intensity military conflict remains real and requires a smart, multifaceted approach”.

Daniel Pinkston, North East Asia Deputy Project Director

 Tim Johnston

“Aside from strengthening containment and deterrence, the five parties need to develop new channels of communication with North Korea outside the nuclear file. International organisations, the private sector and civil society can play an important role in shaping relations and averting catastrophes”.

Tim Johnston, Asia Program Director

 

“The Korean nuclear standoff is likely to continue. Deterrence and containment are necessary. But we should not give up on engaging North Korea. The self-imposed isolation of Pyongyang is dangerous: even if it is very difficult, we must pursue broader engagement on other issues, in pursuit of small, incremental changes”.

Jean-Marie Guéhenno, President & CEO