You must enable JavaScript to view this site.
This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies. Review our legal notice and privacy policy for more details.
Homepage > Regions / Countries > Middle East & North Africa > Iraq, Iran & the Gulf > Iraq > Arming Iraq’s Kurds: Fighting IS, Inviting Conflict

Arming Iraq’s Kurds: Fighting IS, Inviting Conflict

Middle East Report N°158 12 May 2015

A Kurdish Peshmerga fighter holds a a rocket-propelled grenade launcher as he takes up position in an area overlooking Baretle village (background), which is controlled by the Islamic State, in Khazir, on the edge of Mosul September 8, 2014.



Loosely organised in an ad hoc coalition, Western countries rushed military aid to Iraqi Kurds in the face of a lightning assault by the Islamic State (IS) in June 2014. They failed, however, to develop a strategy for dealing with the consequences of arming non-state actors in Iraq, a country whose unity they profess to support. Rather than forging a strong, unified military response to the IS threat, building up Kurdish forces accelerated the Kurdish polity’s fragmentation, increased tensions between these forces and non-Kurds in disputed areas and strengthened Iraq’s centrifugal forces. Delivered this way, military assistance risks prolonging the conflict with IS, worsening other longstanding, unresolved conflicts and creating new ones. A new approach is called for that revives and builds on past efforts to transform Kurdish forces into a professional institution.

Despite Western concerns, doing so is unlikely to enhance chances of Kurdish independence. Kurdish parties have become even more dependent, not less, on their alliances with Turkey and Iran since IS’s arrival. Turkey, the country with the ability to give the Kurds the independent revenue stream from oil sales they would need to move effectively toward independence, has given no indication it is prepared to do so and every indication it wishes to preserve Iraq’s unity. Western states’ current practice of channelling weapons to the Kurds via Baghdad and encouraging the two sides to resolve their outstanding disputes over oil exports and revenues also will keep the Kurdish region inside Iraq. Indeed, the development of a professional Kurdish military force is a necessary condition for effective coordination with the Baghdad government in joint operations against IS and in preparing a post-IS political plan.

Coalition military aid is premised on a belief that giving weapons and training to Kurdish forces, known as peshmergas, will in itself improve their performance against IS, a notion Kurdish leaders were quick to propagate. But the evolving state of Iraqi Kurdish politics makes for a rather more ambiguous picture: the dominant, rival parties, the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan), have been moving away from a strategic framework agreement that had stabilised their relationship after a period of conflict and allowed them to present a unified front to the central government as well as neighbouring Iran and Turkey. Moreover, their historic leaders, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, are on the political wane, triggering an intra-elite power struggle.

This is, therefore, a particularly fragile moment. Rather than shore up Kurdish unity and institutions, the latest iteration of the “war on terror” is igniting old and new internecine tensions and undermining whatever progress has been achieved in turning the peshmergas into a professional, apolitical military force responding to a single chain of command. In doing so, it is also paving the way for renewed foreign involvement in Kurdish affairs, notably by Iran. And it is encouraging Kurdish land grabs and a rush on resources in territories they claim as part of their autonomous region, further complicating their rapport with Sunni Arab neighbours and the government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.

On the face of it, after an initial delivery directly to the KDP in August 2014, Western military aid has been provided to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), with prior approval from Baghdad. In practice, however, weapon deliveries from a variety of donors are unilateral, mostly uncoordinated and come without strings regarding their distribution and use on the front lines. As a result, they have disproportionately benefited the KDP, which is dominant in Erbil, the region’s capital, and thus have pushed the PUK into greater reliance on Iranian military assistance and an alliance with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Kurdish rebel organisation in Turkey. In this context, the KDP and PUK, formal partners in a unity government, have shown little inclination to distribute roles or mount joint operations, preferring competition over coordination. As a result, Kurdish forces have been less effective in fighting IS than they could have been.

While coalition members have tied military assistance to acceptance of the central government’s sovereign role in its distribution, they are jeopardising their stated interest in preserving Iraq’s unity. Indeed, by upsetting the fragile equilibrium among Kurds, between Kurds and Sunni Arabs and between the Kurds and the governments in Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara, they risk weakening it; moreover, by empowering Kurdish party-based forces, they hasten the state’s de-institutionalisation and invite external interference. Given how fragile and fragmented Iraq has become, one can only wonder how pouring more arms into it could have any chance of making it stronger.

Coalition members, working in coordination, need instead to persuade Kurdish parties to complete the reunification of their parallel military, security and intelligence agencies within a single, non-partisan structure by empowering the KDP-PUK joint brigades and the peshmergas’ most professional elements; to cooperate with non-Kurdish actors in the disputed territories; and to develop a post-IS plan with the central government that cements security cooperation in these territories and moves forward the process of resolving their status through negotiation.

The KRG leadership is overdue in putting its own house in order. It may revel in momentary support for its fight against IS, but old problems will soon return, arguably posing a far more serious threat to the region’s stability than IS by itself could ever represent.


To the governments of the U.S. and other coalition members:

1.  Establish a coalition central command through which to channel military aid to Iraqi Kurds and charge it with:

a) coordinating weapons deliveries to, and training of, Kurdish peshmerga forces by coalition members;

b) ensuring that weapons are exclusively distributed to, and used by, KDP-PUK joint brigades;

c) engaging the peshmerga affairs minister and KDP-PUK joint-brigade commanders on military tactics and the use of coalition-supplied weapons; and

d) conditioning military support on coordination of anti-IS operations with non-Kurdish actors in the disputed territories and the Abadi government, and drafting with the Abadi government a post-IS plan that foresees the reinstatement of local institutions and security forces in these areas.

To the peshmerga affairs minister and the KDP and PUK leaderships:

2.  Establish a joint operations room bringing together the minister, KDP-PUK joint-brigade commanders and relevant security agencies to draft a Kurdish national security strategy that would ease delivery of coalition military aid.

3.  Continue to integrate paramilitary forces into KDP-PUK joint brigades that respond to a single chain of command and refrain from deploying irregular forces against IS.

4.  Improve coordination with the Abadi government and Iraqi army on the provision of weapons and training to the KRG.

5.  Complete integration of the KDP and PUK military, security and intelligence services into the KRG.

To the Kurdistan region presidency:

6.  Encourage consolidation of KRG institutions in general and the peshmerga affairs ministry in particular and their emancipation from partisan control.

7.  Engage the Abadi government on the future of the disputed territories and local institutions and refrain from calls for Kurdish independence.

8.  Redouble efforts to coordinate KRG regional security operations with PKK and PKK-allied forces.

To the government of Iraq:

9.  Develop a joint security strategy with the KRG to counter IS, and work with the KRG to settle outstanding disputes over oil exports and budget allocations.

To the governments of Turkey and Iran:

10.  Support coalition efforts toward institutionalising peshmerga forces and reinforcing their cooperation with the central government.

Baghdad/Erbil/Brussels, 12 May 2015 
This page in:

More Information

Media Contacts

Nadja Leoni Nolting (Brussels)
+32 (0) 2 541 1635

Michael Zumot (Brussels)
+32 (0) 2 290 57 62

Contact Crisis Group’s Communications Unit:


 Maria Fantappie

“Coalition military assistance is unintentionally helping to turn peshmerga into an assemblage of paramilitary groupings, each responding to a different party leader. The West should ensure its aid boosts, rather than undermines, the peshmergas’ development into a professional military. The alternative is to risk the multiplication of personality-based factions resorting to private militias to compete with each other and other Iraqi factions over land and resources”.

Maria Fantappie, Iraq Senior Analyst

 Peter Harling

“Kurdish institutional reform is a must. At a time of political flux, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) should invest in a generation of peshmerga officers that stays clear of partisan politics. A fragmented, personality-driven security apparatus will undoubtedly open the door to creeping foreign interference and security breaches, putting the KRG at a far greater risk than does the Islamic State”.

Peter Harling, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria Project Director and Senior Middle East and North Africa Adviser


“The net effect of coalition support has been to allow the Islamic State (IS) to endure. It has entrenched intra-Kurdish rivalries, providing space for Iranian influence to grow; and it has remained silent on Kurdish land grabs in disputed territories, undermining the Kurds’ relations with Baghdad and increasing the local Sunni Arab resentment on which IS feeds. IS’s defeat will depend on Kurdish parties cooperating in transforming the peshmergas into a professional military force and balancing their common interests vis-à-vis Iran and Turkey in the way their internal strategic agreement used to do”.

Joost Hiltermann, Middle East and North Africa Program Director


“The international community does not leverage its military aid to bring more coherence to the Kurdistan Regional Government because it does not want to increase the risk of a break-up of Iraq, but this lack of coordination encourages the proliferation of paramilitary forces, thus eventually increasing the risk of the break-up it wants to avoid”.

Jean ­Marie Guéhenno, President & CEO


Kurdish Military Deployments in Northern Iraq

Kurdish military deployments

Diagram of Intra-Kurdish Relationships in Northern Iraq