Tunisia’s Borders: Jihadism and Contraband
Middle East and North Africa Report N°148
28 Nov 2013
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Tunisia is embroiled in recurrent political crises whose origins in security concerns are ever more evident. While still of low-intensity, jihadi attacks are increasing at an alarming rate, fuelling the rumour mill, weakening the state and further polarising the political scene. The government coalition, dominated by the Islamist An-Nahda, and the secular opposition trade accusations, politicising questions of national security rather than addressing them. Meanwhile, the gap widens between a Tunisia of the borders – porous, rebellious, a focal point of jihadism and contraband – and a Tunisia of the capital and coast that is concerned with the vulnerability of a hinterland it fears more than it understands. Beyond engaging in necessary efforts to resolve the immediate political crisis, actors from across the national spectrum should implement security but also socio-economic measures to reduce the permeability of the country’s borders.
The security vacuum that followed the 2010-2011 uprising against Ben Ali’s regime – as well as the chaos generated by the war in Libya – largely explains the worrying increase in cross-border trafficking. Although contraband long has been the sole source of income for numerous residents of border provinces, the introduction of dangerous and lucrative goods is a source of heightened concern. Hard drugs as well as (for now) relatively small quantities of firearms and explosives regularly enter the country from Libya. Likewise, the northern half of the Tunisian-Algerian border is becoming an area of growing trafficking of cannabis and small arms. These trends are both increasing the jihadis’ disruptive potential and intensifying corruption of border authorities.
One ought neither exaggerate nor politicise these developments. Notably, and against conventional wisdom, military equipment from Libya has not overwhelmed the country. But nor should the threat be underestimated. The war in Libya undoubtedly has had security repercussions and armed groups in border areas have conducted attacks against members of the National Guard, army and police, posing a significant security challenge that the return of Tunisian fighters from Syria has amplified. By the same token, the aftermath of the Tunisian uprising and of the Libyan war has provoked a reorganisation of contraband cartels (commercial at the Algerian border, tribal at the Libyan border), thereby weakening state control and paving the way for far more dangerous types of trafficking.
Added to the mix is the fact that criminality and radical Islamism gradually are intermingling in the suburbs of major cities and in poor peripheral villages. Over time, the emergence of a so-called islamo-gangsterism could contribute to the rise of groups blending jihadism and organised crime within contraband networks operating at the borders – or, worse, to active cooperation between cartels and jihadis.
Addressing border problems clearly requires beefing up security measures but these will not suffice on their own. Even with the most technically sophisticated border control mechanisms, residents of these areas – often organised in networks and counting among the country’s poorest – will remain capable of enabling or preventing the transfer of goods and people. The more they feel economically and socially frustrated, the less they will be inclined to protect the country’s territorial integrity in exchange for relative tolerance toward their own contraband activities.
Weapons and drug trafficking as well as the movement of jihadi militants are thus hostage to informal negotiations between the informal economy’s barons and state representatives. Since the fall of Ben Ali’s regime, such understandings have been harder to reach. The result has been to dilute the effectiveness of security measures and diminish the availability of human intelligence that is critical to counter terrorist or jihadi threats. In an uncertain domestic and regional context, restoring trust among political parties, the state and residents of border areas is thus as crucial as intensifying military control in the most porous areas.
In the long term, only minimal consensus among political forces on the country’s future can enable a truly effective approach to the border question. On this front, at the time of writing, an end to the political crisis seems distant: discussions regarding formation of a new government; finalising a new constitution and new electoral law; and appointing a new electoral commission are faltering. Without a resolution of these issues, polarisation is likely to increase and the security situation to worsen, each camp accusing the other of exploiting terrorism for political ends. Overcoming the crisis of trust between the governing coalition and the opposition is thus essential to breaking this vicious cycle.
Yet the current political impasse should not rule out some immediate progress on the security front. Working together to reinforce border controls, improving relations between the central authorities and residents of border areas as well as improving relations among Maghreb states: these are all tasks that only can be fully carried out once underlying political conflicts have been resolved but that, in the meantime, Tunisian actors can ill-afford to ignore or neglect.
To reach a political consensus on security questions
To the main political parties, members of the National Constituent Assembly and representatives of residents of areas adjacent to the Algerian and Libyan borders (business and civil society stakeholders, tribal chiefs):
1. Create working groups whose aim would be to achieve a consensual and non-partisan approach to border control and public security and present their conclusions to regional and national authorities.
To contribute to the prevention of new jihadi violence through security measures and the improvement of relations with border residents
To the Tunisian government:
2. Intensify checks at the south-eastern border, notably at the Ras Jdir and Dhehiba-Wazen crossings.
3. Increase the number of mixed patrols (customs, police, National Guard, intelligence, military) under the control of the Tunisian Armed Forces and conduct additional joint training between the military and National Guard.
4. Pursue efforts to create a national intelligence agency and integrate intelligence services and counter-terrorism units within it.
5. Develop social and professional reinsertion programs for Tunisian fighters returning from the Syrian front.
To the Algerian, Tunisian and Libyan governments:
6. Strengthen security cooperation, notably by adding joint border checkpoints and joint patrols and encourage information sharing.
To central, regional and local authorities as well as representatives of residents of border areas (business and civil society stakeholders, tribal chiefs):
7. Discuss practical means to strengthen local border control mechanisms, notably via human intelligence.
8. Discuss the possibility of establishing free trade zones in border areas.
To the Tunisian trade and handicrafts ministry and its Algerian and Libyan counterparts:
9. Undertake feasibility studies on the creation of free-trade zones in border areas.
To Tunisia’s principal Western partners (France, Italy, Germany, the U.S. and the European Union):
10. Focus economic cooperation, investment and development aid on the country’s border and interior areas.
11. Encourage – politically, financially and technically – security sector reform, notably by professionalising security forces and avoiding politicisation of their management.
12. Encourage and facilitate inter-Maghreb security cooperation, notably by bolstering information sharing regarding Libya with the Tunisian government, particularly within the context of the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM).
Tunis/Brussels, 28 November 2013